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Regulation, Governance and Informality 
An Empirical Analysis of Selected Countries 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The Informal Economy provides employment to more than 60 per cent of the labour 
population in the developing world despite being a site unfettered by regulations and social 
norms of fairness governing pay and work conditions. In assessing the factors behind an 
informal agent’s decision to formalize, it is asserted that rigidity in regulatory mechanism is 
the primary cause that impedes the process of formalization. However whether flexible 
regulations can encourage formalization by making gains of formalization more accessible 
and certain remains a question. In this paper we argue that flexible regulations does not 
necessarily manifest into the incentives that are essential for formalization. Reducing rigidities 
in regulation has a significant pay off only in the ambit of good governance. More specifically 
we hypothesise that degree of intensity of regulation will hardly matter in containing 
informality; rather what matters is the quality of governance and capability of the institutions to 
put the regulations into effect. Using secondary data for 46 countries over the period between 
1980 and 2008, we empirically investigate into the linkages between governance, regulation 
and informal employment by developing static and dynamic panel data models and establish 
that in curbing informality what turns out to be crucial is the interaction between quality of 
governance and regulation.  
 
Keywords: Formalization; Governance; Informal Economy; Panel data; Regulation  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The informal economy has been occupying a key position in the development-discourse ever 
since it was ‗discovered‘ in Ghana in the early 1970s
1
. A great deal of literature has emerged 
in the past forty years directed towards ‗formalizing‘ the concept of informality and to integrate 
it within mainstream development economic theory. Unfortunately however, the informal 
economy has not yet received the attention that it merits (Marjit and Kar 2011) given its size
2
 
and economic importance.
3
  
 
Despite employing almost three-fourths of the labor population in the developing world, the 
informal economy, by and large, comprises of economic units and workers that remain 
outside the world of regulated activities and protected employment relationships (Chen 2006). 
According to Hart (2006), the label ‗informal‘ may be popular because it is both positive and 
negative. ―To act informally is to be free and flexible; but the term also says what people are 
not doing—not wearing conventional dress, and not being regulated by the state‖ (Hart 2006: 
28). Loyaza (1994) claims that the informal sector, however, face the disadvantages of 
working outside the legal system—it is a site unfettered by the regulations and social norms of 
fairness governing pay and work conditions that are more at play in the formal sector. The 
inherently exploitative nature of the informal sector stems directly out of the missing regulation 
associated with the notion of informality. The unregulated informal economy thus manifests 
itself in underpayment of workers, violation of minimum wage laws, abysmal working 
conditions and lack of mechanism of workers voicing their concerns to their employers. While 
this may be the consequence of informality from the micro perspective, from macro view 
point, ―high informality rates limit government resources, which could be used productively, 
and depress the growth of aggregate demand, hampering a country‘s successful integration 
into the world economy‖ (Bacchetta et al 2009: 127). Successful formalization strategies, 
thus, does not only contribute towards improving the conditions of the labour market but also 
are preconditions for overall growth and development. These arguments seem to justify why 
formalization of the informal agents (thereby curbing the size of informality) demands careful 
attention in the formality-informality discourse. The pertinent question then becomes: What 
constitutes successful strategies of formalization that will generate incentives attracting 
informal agents to join the formal economy? 
 
Although formalization aims to bring a substantial part of the unregulated economy under the 
coverage of regulation, existing literature documents that attempts in tackling informality 
through legislating strict and rigid regulations proves to be self-defeating and even increases 
the level informality in an economy. In fact, De Soto (1989) claims that rigid regulations are a 
cause of informality rather than solution to it. He stresses on the fact that the decision to 
remain formal or informal depends primarily on the costs and benefits of formalization. Rigid 
regulations are almost certain to increase costs of and reduce the perceived benefits from the 
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process of formalization. Recent studies by Marjit and Kar (2011), Amin (2006), Chen (2006), 
Guha-Khasnobis et al (2006) among many others reach similar conclusion. 
 
Given the positive association between rigid regulations and size of informality, the process of 
formalization is, thus, almost certain to fail with rigid regulations in place. So does this actually 
mean that the sufficient condition to curb informality and enhance the process of transition 
from informality to formality is to make gains of formalization more accessible and certain by 
removing rigidities in regulation and making them more flexible?
4
 Put differently, will some 
kind of reforms in the existing body of regulation prove to be sufficient in providing incentive to 
workers to formalize by increasing the benefits of regulation and reducing its cost?  
 
This paper argues that we should exercise caution regarding the process of adding flexibility 
to the regulatory mechanism to solve the problem of informality as flexible regulation need not 
always directly manifest into the incentives essential for formalization. We argue that 
adjusting regulation to curb informality will bring about the desired effects only when the 
regulatory institutions have the capability and willingness to put the regulations into effect. 
This proposition implies that strengthening the incentive mechanism of formalization requires 
improving the quality of institutions that have the authority to put the flexible regulations into 
effect. In other words, it is the quality of governance and institution and the extent to which the 
regulations are put into effect – in brief, the interaction between governance and regulation - 
that is important, not the number and quality of regulations on the informal sector. Therefore, 
instead of only concentrating on the quality of regulation, one should explore the interaction 
between regulations and quality of institutions deeply. 
 
This paper adds to the growing body of literature of informality by trying to empirically capture 
the dynamics between regulation, governance and informality using standard econometric 
techniques. Recent studies (Jonnasen 2011; Adaman and Mumcu 2010; Kanbur 2009, 
Loayza et al 2006; Schneider 2002) have related institutions and governance to informality in 
theoretical and empirical framework to highlight that good governance has a major role to 
contain informality and that the impact of regulation is largely contingent upon institutional 
capacities and the desire and the capability to enforce the same. Our results complement 
these findings by providing a formal econometric model. We use secondary data on 46 
countries from the period 1980 to 2008 to explore the dynamics between regulation and 
quality of institutions in the context of curbing the size of the informal sector.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of existing literature 
relating to regulation, institutional capabilities and informal economy. In Section 3 we describe 
the data used in our analysis. In Section 4 descriptive statistics are reported and graphical 
analysis of the relation between our study variables is presented. In Section 5, we present the 
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econometric models and report quantitative results based on the models. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The dynamics between regulation and informality has often been explored in development 
literature. The initial idea was that the informal sector was primarily composed of agents 
whose primary motive was tax evasion. In that way informality was seen to be akin to 
illegality. According to Chen (2006), however, the proposition that it was the desire to evade 
taxes that led agents to operate in the informal sector is an over simplification of the causes of 
informality. Chen claims that the cost-benefit analysis of working in the regulated sector is 
important in explaining the choice of working in the informal sector. She points out that 
economic agents operate informally not to evade taxes but because ―the regulatory 
environment is too punitive, too cumbersome or simply non-existent‖ and also that agents 
―would be willing to pay registration fees and taxes if they were to receive the benefits of 
formality‖ (Chen 2006: 80).  
 
That the nature of regulation itself leads to its evasion is also documented by Schneider 
(2002): ―The increase of the intensity of regulations is another important factor which reduces 
the freedom for individuals engaged in the official economy….Regulations lead to substantial 
increase in labour cost [and] these costs provide another incentive to work in the informal 
economy‖ (Schneider 2002: 28). Summarizing Johnson, Kaufman and Sheifer (1997), 
Schneider further argues that countries with burdensome regulation tend to have a higher 
share of the unofficial economy in total GDP. It is empirically found that a one-point increase 
of regulation index, ceteris paribus, is associated with 8.1 percentage point increase in share 
of informal economy. Loyaza (1996) finds evidence that regulations entail a substantial 
compliance costs in Latin America as well as Asia. Amin (2008) using data of 1948 retail 
stores in India analyze the effect of labour regulations on employment at store level and 
conclude that stricter labour regulations encourage firms to operate in the informal retail 
sector. That burdensome regulation may perpetuate informality is also claimed by Marjit and 
Kar (2011). They argue that it is possible that imposition of high tax burden may create more 
informality in the system. They also point out ironically efforts to formalize the informal sector 
through formal regulations often have an adverse effect on entrepreneurial talent and may 
lead to loss of employment accentuating the poverty population in the economy. That 
association of the informal with unstructured has been a powerful impetus for government 
intervention leading to major policy failures is well documented by Guha-Khasnobis et al. 
(2006). They present an important case study of Nepal where government‘s effort to 
nationalize forests led to greater deforestation since the government regulatory body could 
not realize that increasing power of small local communities that were already present and 
had better structures to deal with the deforestation would have been a better measure of 
tackling deforestation rather than replacing them by formal state structures. Chen (2006) thus 
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correctly summarize: ―excessive regulation not only hurts one‘s attempt to formalize but also 
his/her effort to earn a livelihood in the informal economy‖.  
 
Thus informality can essentially be viewed as a direct outcome of the quality and coverage of 
regulation. Theories and empirics having strongly established the fact the rigid regulations are 
mainly responsible for cutting down on one‘s incentive to formalize. Thus the natural 
response to this would be to explore into the possibility of a regulation system which would be 
more flexible and provide incentives to formalize. Recent works however does not regard 
flexible regulation or deregulation as the sufficient condition to tackle problems of informality. 
For curbing informality, removing rigidity may be a necessary condition but the issue of 
whether introducing flexibility will manifest into the incentives necessary for formalization 
demands careful analysis. Analyzing consequences of flexibility in labour regulations, Chen 
(2006) argues that de-regulation of labour markets is often associated with the rise of 
informalization. She claims that in such cases ―workers are caught between two contradictory 
trends: rapid flexibilization of the employment relationship (making it easy for employers to 
contract and expand their workforce as needed) and slow liberalization of labour mobility‖ 
(Chen 2006: 89) Thus to protect informal workers from the ‗economic risks‘ and ‗uncertainty 
associated with flexibility and informalization‘ the policy of enhancing flexibility in labour 
regulations seems to be inappropriate and self-destructive.  Reflecting on this, recent 
literature (Jonnasen 2011; Adaman and Mumcu 2010; Boragen Aruoba 2010; Kanbur 2009; 
Loyaza et al 2006; Chen 2005; Schneider 2002) argue that in reducing the level of informality, 
the impact of regulation is largely contingent upon the institutional capacities to enforce the 
laws and regulations that are legislated. These studies argue that what is crucial in context of 
curbing informality is not simply making regulations flexible but the quality of the institutions 
that are endowed with the responsibility to enforce the legislated regulations. According to 
Kanbur (2009) the central determining factor behind the impact of regulation on economic 
activity is the nature and the intensity of enforcement of regulation. Thus the success or 
failure of formalization measures depends on the measures themselves as much as on the 
specific political, economic, social or cultural circumstances of their implementation. For 
instance, Schneider (2002) argues that a deterioration in the quality of public goods (such as 
the public infrastructure) and of the administration is often coupled with the consequence of 
even stronger incentives to participate in the informal economy. Adaman and Mumcu (2010) 
in an interesting paper using a strategic form game with incomplete information reach a 
somewhat similar conclusion. They show how perceived governance effectiveness 
determines a firm‘s decision to remain formal or informal. The model constructed by them 
characterizes informality as a unique self-fulfilling equilibrium outcome that is inversely 
related to government effectiveness.  
 
These findings demonstrate that lack of proper enforcement—due to institutional failures—
reinforces informality (Dreher and Schneider 2010) and thus government should put more 
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emphasis on improving enforcement of laws and regulation, rather than increasing their 
numbers (Schneider 2002). Assuming that most of the poor operate outside the formal sector, 
Marjit and Kar (2011) find ―income level of a typical poor is positively affected by weak 
governance‖ (Marjit and Kar 2011: 28) suggesting, again, that weak governance perpetuates 
the level of informality. In this context, Guha-Khasnobis et al (2006) cite an important case 
study by Andersson and Pacheco (2006) which illustrates the differential impact of a 
decentralization programme adopted in Bolivia on the actual policies adopted by the 
municipalities. They show that simply assigning formal property rights is not sufficient to 
ensure that timber practices are improved and income is increased. Municipalities that were 
well connected to higher level government agencies were able to utilize effectively the new 
property rights assigned to them.  Thus in analyses of formal property rights reform, ―these 
findings illustrate the value of considering the fit between existing local institutional 
arrangements and the formal government policies‖.
5
 
 
Thus recent literature on informality essentially points out that it is the quality of governance 
and capability of institutions to enforce the regulations—and not simply the coverage of 
regulations—that determine the size of the informal sector
6
. Based on existing literature we 
hypothesize that adjusting the coverage of regulations would be completely pointless in 
enhancing formalization in presence of poor quality institutions. For encouraging formalization 
(and hence curbing informality) greater emphasis should be put on improving quality of formal 
institutions and the overall level of governance. The objective of this study is essentially to 
test the validity of this hypothesis.   
 
3. DATA 
In this paper we intend to empirically document the relation among regulation, governance 
and size of informality
7
. To that end we start by considering data on informal employment
8
 
(proxy to size of informality), regulation and quality of legal system (proxy to quality of 
governance) for 46 countries over the period 1980 to 2008. However, since reliable statistics 
on informal employment are not readily available for all the countries included in our analysis 
for every year - particularly among LDCs - the number of observation corresponding to each 
country differ substantially, varying between 2 to 13
9
. Apart from considering these variables 
we also consider few other variables which we have used in our regression analyses as 
control variables in the subsequent section.  Details about the data, including a list of 
countries, are available in the Appendix. 
 
3.1 Size of Informality (INF) 
In this study we use data on informal employment as a proxy to size of informality. The study 
is based on the informal employment data available from World Bank (Key Indicators of Labor 
Market [KILM])
10
 and International Institute of Labor Studies (IILS)
11
. However, since 
deficiency of reliable informal employment statistics is pronounced for a large number of 
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countries and for large time periods, for incorporating some those countries in the analysis, 
proximate informality figures have been used. For instance, for some countries informal 
employment (as a percentage of total employment) is taken as the difference between total 
employment (in percentage) and total wage employment (in percentage), to arrive at a 
proximate figure where total Employment figures obtained from ILO and wage employment 
figures obtained from KILM. And in other cases the vulnerable employment (as a percentage 
of total employment) figures available from World Bank Data Bank have been used as 
proximate estimates of informality. 
 
3.2 Regulation 
Data on regulation has been primarily drawn from Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) 
Database 2010 (The Fraser Institute). In this report, the extent and nature of regulation 
legislated in various countries is captured through, namely, index of credit market regulation, 
index of labour market regulation and index of business regulation. All the indices are in form 
of scores assigned on a specific scale.  The simple average of these three indices is 
computed to arrive at the index of overall regulation. A brief description of data pertaining to 
the different categories of regulation is presented below: 
(A) Credit Regulation (CMR): This category reflects the domestic credit market 
conditions. Scoring takes into account the extent to which the banking industry is 
dominated by private firms, whether foreign banks are permitted to compete in the 
market, the extent to which credit is supplied to the private sector and whether 
controls on interest rates interfere with the market in credit. Countries that use a 
private banking system to allocate credit to private parties and refrain from controlling 
interest rates receive higher ratings for this regulatory component.   
(B) Labour Market Regulation (LMR): Many types of labor-market regulations infringe 
on the economic freedom of employees and employers. Among the more prominent 
are minimum wages, dismissal regulations, centralized wage setting, extension of 
union contracts to nonparticipating parties, and conscription. A country which allows 
market forces to determine wages and establish the conditions of hiring and firing, 
and refrain from the use of conscription have been given higher scores 
(C) Business Regulation (BR): This regulation-category is made up of components 
designed to identify the extent to which regulations and bureaucratic procedures 
restrain entry and reduce competition. High scores have been allotted to countries 
which allow markets to determine prices and refrain from regulatory activities that 
retard entry into business and increase the cost of producing products. 
(D) Overall Regulation (REG): Scores on overall regulation is the simple average of 
credit market regulation, labour market regulation and business regulation. Zero-to-10 
rating scale; higher ratings indicative of greater flexibility in the system or greater 
economic freedom, lower ratings imply presence of rigidity in the system.  
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3.3 Index of Governance (LP) 
Index of Governance essentially captures the quality of institutions in an economy.  It is 
proxied by the Index of Legal System derived from the Economic Freedom of the World 
Database 2010. The data corresponding to the index of legal system are in form of scoring/ 
ranks: higher scores assigned to countries with independent judiciary, impartial courts, 
protected property rights, easy enforceability of contracts etc.  
 
3.4 Control Variables 
Our study pre-dominantly explores the relationship among regulation, quality of governance 
and size of informality.  However, since the relationship between these variables gets 
influenced by several other variables we try to incorporate a representative set of these 
variables in our regression analysis so as to control for the effects that these variables might 
generate on the estimated relationships among the study variables. In this study, we use four 
such variables, namely, log of GDP per capita (constant 2000 US $) (LGDPPC), index of size 
of government, index of access to sound money and index of trade openness (proxied by 
index of freedom to trade internationally)
12
. To control for the impact of growth on the level of 
informality, log of GDP per capita is used in our analysis (Loyaza et al. (2006) find that growth 
has a significant negative effect on the size of informality).  
 
The index of size of government (SOG) measures the degree to which a country relies on 
personal choice rather than government budgets and political decision making, that is, it 
measures the extent to which countries rely on political process to allocate resources and 
goods and services. Countries with low levels of government spending as a share of the total, 
a smaller government enterprise sector, and lower marginal tax rates earn the highest ratings 
in this area. The reason for inclusion of this variable as a control variable is that the presence 
of government must influence the share of formal employment – by either providing direct 
employment opportunities to the workers or creating a space for formal transactions.  
 
The index of access to sound money (SM) incorporates two issues: one, the consistency of 
monetary policy (or institutions) with long term price stability and two, the ease with which 
other currencies can be used via domestic and foreign bank accounts. High rating have been 
given to those countries which follow policies and adopt institutions that lead to low (and 
stable) rates of inflation and avoid regulations that limit the ability to use alternative 
currencies. The index of access to sound money is used in our analysis with the following 
objective: since informal employment gives much flexibility to producers (they do not have to 
adhere to minimum wage laws etc.), they would like to prefer to employ workers from the 
informal sector in presence of highly volatile financial conditions and unstable money market 
in order to avoid risk. In order words, unstable money market does not encourage business 
activities to be thrived and thereby let the workers to find livelihood in the informal sector.  
 
9 
 
The index of trade openness (FTI) proxied by index of freedom to trade internationally 
comprises of components that measure restrictions on international trade such as tariffs, 
quotas, hidden administrative restraints and exchange rate and capital controls. Higher 
ratings have been assigned to those countries which have relatively more flexible trade 
barriers: low tariff, a trade sector which is larger than expected, easy clearance and efficiency 
of customs etc. Recent theoretical literature (Marjit and Kar 2011; Maiti and Marjit 2008; Marjit 
et al 2007, Marjit and Beladi 2005; Kar et al 2003) has identified a number of mechanisms 
through which trade can affect informal employment and informal wages. In most cases, trade 
reforms increase informal employment. Thus we intend to control for the possible effects of 
trade openness on informality in exploring the linkages among regulation, governance and 
size of informality.  
 
Among the control variables used, GDP per capita (at constant 2000 USD) figures have been 
derived from the World Bank Databank and all other indices have been derived from the 
Economic Freedom of the World Database.  
 
 
4. STYLIZED FACTS 
This section provides stylized facts pertaining to the three key variables of our analysis. We 
begin by analyzing the present state of informality across the world in brief and then go on to 
examine the relation among the three variables somewhat informally before going for formal 
regression. 
 
4.1 Status of Informality across the Globe 
The importance of the informal economy primarily stems out of the fact that this sector 
employs more than 60 percent of the labour force in LDCs. Not only is informality a reality in 
the third world nations, it also is the means of livelihood of around 20 to 30 percent of the 
working population in the developed nations. Our sample reveals a somewhat similar picture. 
Table 2 shows the informal employment figures for the developed and the less developed 
countries for the decade of 1990 followed by the decade of 2000. Three observations are 
worth noting. Firstly, for both the decades informal employment in less developed countries is 
almost double than that of developed countries; secondly, informal employment exhibits a 
persistent nature, that is, for both - the less developed and the developed - informal 
employment has remained almost stable over both the decades, and thirdly, developed 
countries registers a three percent drop in the level of informal employment.  
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Table 1. Mean Informal Employment (in %) in Developed and Less Developed 
Countries 
 
Countries 
Years 
1990-2000 2000-08 
Developed  31.80 28.74 
Less Developed  62.48 61.13 
Source: KILM, IILS and own estimation. 
 
Figure 1 shows informal employment for five regions, namely, Europe, Asia, Central America, 
Africa, Latin America and Oceania. For both, 1990s and 2000s, Africa (excluding South 
Africa) exhibits highest average informal employment among all the geographical regions and 
Oceania exhibits the lowest. 
 
Figure 1. Mean Informal Employment in Six Continents 
 
Note: (*) indicates that in estimating mean informality for Africa we have not considered South 
Africa. 
Source: KILM, IILS and own estimation. 
 
Table 2 complements Figure 1 to indicate the variation in size of informality across continents. 
Highest variation in informal employment is observed for Asia perhaps due to the fact that the 
nations from Asia included in our sample come from both the ends of spectrum of informal 
employment, that is, our sample includes developed Asian countries like Japan (which 
exhibits low levels of employment in the informal sector) as well as developing Asian 
countries like India and Bangladesh (having extremely high informal employment). Variation 
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in case of African nations are not however significant since the spread of informal 
employment is almost same for all the African nations (excluding South Africa). The two 
Americas (Central and Latin America) exhibit moderate levels of informality coupled with fairly 
low variation for both the decades.  Low mean and variation is persistently displayed by 
Oceania followed by Europe. This is no surprise since these regions house most of the 
developed nations of the world. 
 
Table 2. Standard deviation of informality rates across continents 
Continents 1990-2000 2000-08 
Europe 12.91 13.07 
Asia 24.08 23.22 
Cental America 14.57 11.47 
Africa* 16.18 10.65 
Latin America 8.16 8.34 
Oceania 5.78 4.76 
Note: (*) indicates that in estimating mean informality for Africa we have not considered South 
Africa. 
Source: KILM, IILS and own estimation. 
 
4.2 Linking Informality with Regulation and Governance 
In order to analyze the linkages between regulation and informality and quality of governance 
and informality, we start with a visual exercise. Figures 2 and 3 shows scatter plots that 
represent the relationship between Index of Overall Regulation and Informal Employment and 
Index of Governance and Informal Employment. The graph using Index of Overall Regulation 
indicate that countries that have more flexible regulations have lower share of informal 
employment confirming that rigid regulations do indeed  perpetuate informality. The 
correlation matrix presented in the Appendix also shows that credit market, labour market and 
business regulations all are negatively correlated to informality. The graph using Quality of 
Governance (as proxied by Index of Legal System) also shows a somewhat similar 
relationship indicating countries with weak governance (such as, Bangladesh, Brazil, 
Colombia, Georgia, India, Pakistan, Zambia, Zimbabwe etc.) have a larger share of workforce 
employed in the informal sector. However there is at least one caveat regarding such visual 
evaluation. When evaluating the impact of regulation on size of informality we cannot say to 
what extent other related variables (like quality of institutions, say) exert their influence on the 
relationship between informality and quality of governance. Assessing the impact of a 
particular variable on another, essentially, calls for computation of marginal effects controlling 
for all other variables that might possibly affect the relationship. For evaluating public policy 
the goal should be to find the causal effect between variables of our interest, which is carried 
out in the next section using multiple regression analysis. 
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Figure 2. Relation between Informal Employment (in %) and Index of Overall 
Regulation 
 
Source: KILM, IILS, EFW Database and own estimation 
 
Figure 3. Relation between Informal Employment (in %) and Index of 
Governance 
 
Source: KILM, IILS, EFW Database and own estimation 
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5. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
5.1 Methodological Issues 
The formal empirical analysis of this study is based on the estimated equation: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
where i denotes country and t denotes time. Since our analysis is based on panel data, the 
disturbance term is composed of two parts—a time invariant country (individual) specific 
effect  and an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) error component . 
Explanatory variables are split into variables of interest  and control variables . 
 
Given our research design, the panel data model is preferred over pure time-series or cross-
section models atleast for two reasons. Firstly, in the regression model that we use, it is 
difficult to specify and include all background conditions that influence effectiveness of policy 
or may be correlated with it. This implies that we have to contend with various sources of 
omitted-variable bias. Since in pure cross-section we cannot control for time invariant regional 
unobservable variables, any potential problem of omitted variable bias may become much 
more severe (Rodrik 2008). However, by using panel data models we can control for time 
invariant country specific effects which can in turn tackle reduce the severity of this problem. 
Secondly, since number of data points for each country included in our analysis is limited 
(minimum=2 and maximum=13), analyzing countries individually would not have been 
possible for most of the countries.  
 
Static panel data models can be estimated either by generalized least squares (GLS) or 
ordinary least squares (OLS) method depending on the assumption made about the 
relationship between the set of explanatory variables and the individual specific effect. If it is 
assumed that explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the individual specific effect in all 
time periods, the model is called the Random Effects (RE) Model. Such models are estimated 
by the GLS method, as such specification result in non-spherical variance covariance matrix. 
In absence of such assumption, the model is called the Fixed Effects (FE) Model. This is 
estimated by the standard OLS method eliminating the individual specific effect by ‗within 
group transformation‘. Though Baccheta et al (2009) argue that the GLS technique may be 
regarded to be a more appropriate method, we estimate both versions of panel data model.
13
  
 
The scheme of our regression analysis is as follows: We start off with the standard static 
panel model regressing informality on overall index of regulation, and each of the three 
categories of regulation separately. In each equation, following Loayza et al (2005), we also 
include interaction variables which are constructed by multiplying the index of governance 
and the index of regulation. These interaction terms are included to capture the capacity of 
the institutions to implement the regulations. For instance, in the first model we regress 
informality on Index of Overall Regulation and the respective interaction term (Index of overall 
regulation x Index of governance) along with a set of control variables; in the subsequent 
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models we repeat the same exercise replacing the variables of interest used in first model by 
different indices of regulation and the respective interaction terms. This is done in order to 
analyze how the effect of regulation on informality evolves with changes in quality of 
governance.  
 
Static panel estimators used in this study, however, cannot account for the possible 
endogeneity between implementation of regulation and informality. It is quite likely that the 
size of informal economy is by itself a likely factor in determining a country‘s implementation 
of regulation. This reverse effect is a potential source of bias in the estimated coefficients. To 
address this endogeneity bias we implement the Arellano Bond Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimator that uses lagged values for all variables as instruments. 
 
5.2 Results and Discussion 
5.2.1. Static Panel Regression Results 
Table 3 present the static panel regression results for different specifications of the basic 
model.
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                      Table 3: Static Panel Regression Results 
 
  Dependent Variable: Informal Employment (Inf) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE 
LGDPPC (t-1) -31.27*** 
(-13.55) 
-28.71*** 
(-7.25) 
-31.85*** 
(-13.83) 
-30.44*** 
(-7.19) 
-31.42*** 
(-13.29) 
-28.13*** 
(-6.94) 
-30.73*** 
(-13.19) 
-27.31*** 
(-6.99) 
SOG 0.12 
(0.61) 
0.09 
(0.41) 
0.14 
(0.67) 
0.12 
(0.57) 
0.27 
(1.28) 
0.23 
(1.01) 
0.12 
(0.62) 
0.07 
(0.35) 
SM 0.41* 
(1.76) 
0.36 
(1.53) 
0.44** 
(1.88) 
0.39* 
(1.68) 
0.45* 
(1.87) 
0.39 
(1.61) 
0.43* 
(1.84) 
0.38 
(1.59) 
FTI -0.33 
(-1.29) 
-0.28 
(-1.07) 
-0.37 
(-1.50) 
-0.36 
(-1.37) 
-0.32 
(-1.11) 
-0.23 
(-0.79) 
-0.16 
(-0.58) 
-0.08 
(-0.26) 
REG 0.68* 
(1.73) 
0.70* 
(1.77) 
      
CMR   0.57** 
(2.18) 
0.58** 
(2.15) 
    
LMR     -0.02 
(-0.04) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
  
BR       0.94*** 
(2.88) 
0.96*** 
(2.89) 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE 
LP*REG -0.08** 
(-2.10) 
-0.07** 
(-2.05) 
      
LP*CMR   -0.05*** 
(-2.04) 
-0.06* 
(-1.92) 
    
LP*LMR     -0.03 
(-0.83) 
-0.03 
(-0.87) 
  
LP*BR       -0.10*** 
(-2.74) 
-0.10*** 
(-2.66) 
Constant  151.34*** 
(16.99) 
140.79*** 
(9.37) 
153.22*** 
(17.32) 
147.22*** 
(9.24) 
153.203*** 
(16.52) 
139.93*** 
(8.90) 
147.64*** 
(16.16) 
133.74*** 
(8.81) 
Wald Chi-sq, 
Prob> chi-sq 
F-Statistic 
Prob> F 
R sq. (within) 
R sq. (bet.) 
R sq. (overall) 
No. of Obsv. 
No. of countries included 
244.81 
0.00 
 
 
0.27 
0.81 
0.79 
254 
40 
 
 
12.208 
0.00 
0.27 
0.81 
0.79 
254 
40 
257.22 
0.00 
 
 
0.27 
0.81 
0.79 
254 
40 
 
 
12.84 
0.00 
0.27 
0.81 
0.79 
254 
40 
226.83 
0.00 
 
 
0.26 
0.82 
0.79 
251 
40 
 
 
11.84 
0.00 
0.26 
0.81 
0.79 
251 
40 
236.76 
0.00 
 
 
0.28 
0.82 
0.79 
251 
40 
 
 
13.30 
0.00 
0.28 
0.82 
0.79 
251 
40 
Notes: 
(1) ***, **, * indicates coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
(2) Wald Chi-Square is used to assess the overall model fit for Random Effects (RE) Model and F-statistic is used to test the overall model fit for Fixed Effects (FE) 
Model.  
(3) Figures in parenthesis denote z-statistic and t-statistic for RE Model and FE Model respectively. 
 
Source: Own estimation. 
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In Model 1 we report the results obtained by regressing informality on index of overall regulation and 
its interaction term with governance along with the set of control variables for both random effect 
model and fixed effect model. Both the versions—Random Effect and Fixed Effect--show a very good 
overall model fit as indicated by the Wald Chi-Square and F-statistic respectively. The index of overall 
regulation has a significant positive association with informality for both versions of the model. This 
essentially means that as regulatory system is made more flexible - instead of inducing workers to join 
the formal sector and thereby curbing informality - informal employment seems to rise. However, 
when we allow impact of regulation on informality to vary with quality of governance, the positive 
association of the index of regulation with informality seems to be mitigated when quality of 
governance rises. Therefore for low levels of governance, increasing flexibility of regulations will have 
an adverse effect on the process of formalization in both the types of models. As governance 
improves, the amplifying effect of these types of regulation on informality dampens. As for the set of 
control variables, results indicate GDP per capita of the previous period is significantly related to 
informality in a negative way implying that economic growth does adversely affect informality. The 
coefficient of sound money—for only Random Effects—is also significant but positive which means 
that an increasing access to sound money will induce greater informality. The indices of size of 
government and trade openness, although are positive, but fail to be significant. 
 
Models 2, 3 and 4 reports the results obtained by regressing informal employment on different 
categories of regulation along with their interaction terms with governance. The set of control 
variables for each of the model are identical to 1. All the three specifications show a very good overall 
model fit for both fixed and random effect versions. When testing for association between informal 
employment and each category of regulation separately we find that both credit market regulation and 
business regulation are positively and significantly related to informal employment for both random 
effect as well as fixed effect specification which implies that as credit market and business regulations 
are made less rigid, at low levels of governance, informality tends to rise. However, the respective 
interaction terms are significant and negative implying that with rise in quality of governance, flexible 
business and credit regulations does have an informality-curbing effect. However, in case of labour 
regulations we observe that neither the coefficient of labour market regulation nor that of its 
interaction term appears to be significant in both random effect as well as fixed effect model. This is in 
fact a puzzling result since it is very unusual that increasing the flexibility of labour regulation even in 
presence of good governance will not affect informality! We shall see later if this puzzle gets resolved 
when we use the GMM regression to account for the possible endogeneity in the subsequent section. 
The control variables in models 2 and 4 give a more or less consistent result. For both the 
specifications, the coefficient of one period lagged value of Log of GDP Per Capita is negative and 
significant. Index of Sound money is also significant for both the cases (however, index of sound 
money is only weakly significant for the fixed effect versions for equations with explanatory variables 
as credit market regulation and business regulation and insignificant for that with labour market 
regulation as explanatory variable) but is negative. The other two control variables fail to show 
significance for all the model specifications. For checking whether the findings obtained from static 
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panel regression are robust enough we shall go for the GMM estimation coping up with the problem of 
endogeneity if any. 
 
5.2.2 Arellano Bond GMM Regression Results 
The Arellano Bond GMM results are reported in Table 4.   
 
 Table 4. Arellano Bond GMM Regression Results 
 
 Dependent Variable: Informal Employment (INF) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
INF (t-1) 0.47*** 
(7.03) 
0.43*** 
(6.33) 
0.50*** 
(7.39) 
0.48*** 
(7.38) 
SOG (t-1) -0.50** 
(-2.08) 
-0.41* 
(-1.79) 
-0.45* 
(-1.90) 
-0.46** 
(-1.97) 
SM (t-1) 0.22 
(0.93) 
0.23 
(1.00) 
0.21 
(0.94) 
0.16 
(0.69) 
FTI (t-1) 0.65*** 
(2.85) 
0.68*** 
(3.08) 
0.80*** 
(3.25) 
0.78*** 
(3.31) 
REG 0.33 
(0.74) 
   
CMR  -0.08 
(-0.24) 
  
LMR   0.63* 
(1.78) 
 
BR    0.59 
(1.64) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
LP*REG -0.09** 
(-2.24) 
   
LP*CMR  -0.05* 
(-1.75) 
  
LP*LMR   -0.11*** 
(-2.82) 
 
LP*BR    -0.11** 
(-2.59) 
Constant 15.47*** 
(3.65) 
18.03*** 
(4.46) 
12.11*** 
(2.96) 
13.72*** 
(3.66) 
Wald Chi-Square 
Degrees of Freedom 
P-value 
122.58 
6 
0.00 
130.83 
6 
0.00 
126.23 
6 
0.00 
125.15 
6 
0.00 
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No. of instruments 
No. of Observ. 
No. of countries included 
62 
213 
39 
62 
213 
39 
62 
210 
39 
62 
210 
39 
Notes: 
(1) ***, **, * indicates coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
(2) Wald Chi-Square is used to assess the overall model fit.  
(3) Figures in parenthesis denote z-statistic. 
 
 
Before analyzing the GMM results we would first like to point out the changes in the structure of the 
model that we have used. First, the GMM regression technique uses lagged value of the dependent 
variable as an independent variable. Since informal employment and log of GDP per capita are highly 
correlated, using both these as independent variable may lead to the problem of multicollinearity. In 
fact, the reason we had used GDP per capita as a control variable in the static panel regression was 
to control for economic growth. This function is now being undertaken by the lagged informality term, 
rendering GDP per capita superfluous. So owing to these facts, we decide to drop log of GDP per 
capita from our set of control variables. After having made this change we proceeded with the GMM 
technique keeping other control variables intact. However, the results that we obtained were not 
impressive—apart from lagged informality, all other control variables are insignificant. We 
subsequently tried a different specification of the basic model— we used one period lagged value of 
the control variables in our regression. Results improved significantly. Three out of four control 
variables are significant in all the model specifications. We therefore report results pertaining to this 
model only.   
 
All the four specifications show a good model fit as indicated by the value of Wald Chi-square. We 
find that, unlike results from the static panel model, coefficients of indices of overall, credit market and 
business regulation are insignificant. This implies that, for low levels of governance, regulations do not 
affect informality. So legislating regulations with the view to provide formal workers more security 
(thereby trying to attract informal workers to the formal sector) or relaxing credit norms for formal 
entrepreneurs (as a part of the incentive scheme designed for informal entrepreneurs to start 
entrepreneurial activities in the ambit of formal sector) will be totally meaningless in presence of weak 
institutions which have little or no capability of implementing these regulations. However, labour 
market regulations exhibit a somewhat differential impact on informality. The coefficient of labour 
market regulation shows significance (although at 10 percent level) and its positive sign possibly 
indicates that in presence of weak governance, flexible labour regulations allow ―formal‖ employers to 
hire workers ―informally‖ making the entire process of legislation of pro-formalization regulations 
superfluous. The interaction terms with governance for all the model specifications, however, are 
negative and significant implying as quality of governance improves, flexible regulations do help in 
curbing the size of informality, thereby enhancing the process of formalization. 
 
As for the control variables, the coefficient of lagged informal employment and index of trade 
openness are positive and show significance at one percent level for all the model specifications 
implying that past period‘s informality as well as past period‘s trade openness have a positive impact 
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on the current period‘s size of informality. Coefficient of size of government is significant but negative 
for all the specifications. This indicates that enhanced opportunity for increased formal transactions 
due to presence of government regulations across all the sectors in the economy will reduce 
informality. Lagged value of index of sound money, however, does not show significance in any of the 
specifications possibly due to the problem of multicollinearity. 
 
The Arellano Bond regression results depart from the static panel results on more than one count: 
1. Although the signs of all the interaction terms in the different specifications remain 
unchanged, the interaction between labour market regulation and governance which was 
found to be insignificant in the static panel regressions now becomes significant in the GMM 
set-up.  
2. The results of the static panel model led to the conclusion that in presence of weak 
governance, flexible regulations lead to an increase in informal employment. A similar effect is 
not found in the Arellano Bond specification — in presence of weak institutions, informality is 
unaffected by the quality and extent of regulation.  
3. The control variables also seem to show differential influence in Arellano Bond specification. 
Size of Government and trade openness become significant; moreover their signs changes 
vis-à-vis static panel specification. On the other hand, index of sound money becomes 
insignificant in the dynamic model. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper empirically examines the linkages between regulation, quality of governance and the size 
of informality. A simple empirical model was designed to show how formal regulations affect the size 
of the informal sector with varying levels of governance captured in our analysis through the usage of 
the interaction term between regulation and governance. The empirical assessment of the model 
supports the main hypothesis: size of the informal sector is lower (and hence, rate of formalization is 
higher) where regulations are flexible and the government has the requisite institutional capacity to 
implement the flexible regulations. This in fact suggests that in context of curbing informality, a sole 
focus on quality and coverage of regulations will not help the policymakers realize their objectives; 
rather a complementary action of removing rigidities in regulation and improving quality of governance 
may have a significant pay-off. Flexible regulations, coupled with weak institutions will be a complete 
failure. 
 
This paper does not aim to provide any advice on policy issues such as how to tackle informality. 
Nevertheless, a brief conclusion that is obtained from our analysis is worth mentioning.  First of all, 
the state should emphasis more on capacity building before trying to intervene. Second, a key issue 
in building capacity is to endow local regional units with greater autonomy—that is, strengthening 
local governance—so that desired regulation can be properly handled. For devising a policy of 
providing incentive to the informal agents to formalize, such local bodies must be strengthened as 
these bodies play the pivotal role to improve the quality of ―social contract‖ between the regulatory 
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authorities and the citizens (Jonnason 2011). However, although strengthening governance may be a 
justifiable proposition in an autocracy, its feasibility in a democracy remains uncertain. Recent studies 
by Marjit and Kar (2011) indicate that the quality of governance is often likely to be determined by 
electoral motives. They argue that if the government is forced to lower tax rate on formal transactions 
(what we refer in our study as implementation of flexible regulation) in order to encourage 
formalization, it is left with lower tax revenue for re-distribution, which, in turn, hurts it‘s chance of 
returning to power in the election. Therefore, in a democratic system, government lowers the 
governance level, indirectly favouring redistribution towards the poor by encouraging informality. 
Therefore, the manner in which the instrument of governance is effectively used to encourage 
formalization remains an interesting agenda for future research. 
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APPENDIX 
 
1A. List of Countries included in the analysis 
 
1. Argentina 
2. Australia 
3. Bangladesh 
4. Belgium 
5. Bolivia 
6. Brazil 
7. Chile 
8. China 
9. Colombia 
10. Costa Rica 
11. Croatia 
12. Ecuador 
13. Finland 
14. Georgia 
15. Greece 
16. Honduras 
17. India 
18. Indonesia 
19. Italy 
20. Japan 
21. Kenya 
22. Luxembourg 
23. Malaysia 
24. Mali 
25. Malta 
26. Mexico 
27. Netherlands 
28. New Zealand 
29. Nicaragua 
30, Norway 
31. Pakistan 
32. Panama 
33. Paraguay 
34. Peru 
35. Poland 
36. Portugal 
37. South Africa 
38. Spain 
39. Switzerland 
40. Thailand 
41. United Kingdom 
42. Uruguay 
43. Venezuela, Bolivarian 
Republic of  
44. Vietnam 
45. Zambia 
46. Zimbabwe 
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Table 1A: Descriptive Statistics for the Variables 
Variables Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Observations 
INF 36.34 21.06 0.49 2.51 6.52 96.70 423 
REG 6.43 1.25 -0.78 4.69 1.20 9.40 423 
CMR 7.80 1.69 -1.45 6.06 0.00 10.00 423 
LMR 5.65 1.43 0.11 2.27 2.30 8.60 372 
BR 5.82 1.19 0.12 2.96 2.70 9.40 329 
LGDPPC 3.74 0.58 -0.35 2.19 2.28 4.75 423 
LP 6.30 2.10 -0.18 2.10 1.40 10.00 422 
SOG 6.06 1.40 -0.25 2.49 2.00 9.30 423 
SM 8.01 1.92 -1.62 6.01 0.00 9.80 423 
FTI 6.97 1.25 -1.45 6.21 1.50 9.30 422 
Source: KILM, ILSS, Economic Freedom of the World and own calculation. 
 
 
Table 2A. Correlation Matrix 
 INF REG CMR LMR BR LGDPPC LP SOG SM FTI 
INF 1          
REG -0.57 1         
CMR -0.56 0.78 1        
LMR -0.21 0.75 0.33 1       
BR -0.57 0.78 0.49 0.37 1      
LGDPPC -0.90 0.54 0.50 0.19 0.59 1     
LP -0.76 0.69 0.47 0.39 0.77 0.79 1    
SOG 0.43 -0.06 -0.11 0.17 -0.21 -0.45 -0.45 1   
SM -0.73 0.54 0.45 0.26 0.54 0.56 0.56 -0.16 1  
FTI -0.41 0.48 0.37 0.22 0.55 0.42 0.55 -0.15 0.63 1 
Source: Economic Freedom of the World Report and own calculation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Adaman F and A Mumcu (2010) Perceptions on Governance Effectiveness and Informality.  Bogazici University, 
Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 2010/05. 
Accessed at http://www.econ.boun.edu.tr/public_html/RePEc/pdf/201005.pdf on 20th August 2011. 
 
Amin M (2008) Labour Regulation, Employment and Informality: Evidence from the Retail Sector in India.  World 
Bank Working Paper Series.  Accessed at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1101490 on 20
th
 August 2011. 
 
Aruoba S Boragan (2010) Informal Sector, Government Policy and Institutions. Working Paper, University of 
Maryland. 
Accessed at http://econweb.umd.edu/~aruoba/research/paper18/paper18.html on 20th August 2011. 
 
Bacchetta M, Ernst E and Bustamante JP (2009) Globalization and Informal Jobs in Developing Countries. 
International Labor Office and World Trade Organization, Geneva: International Institute of Labor Studies and 
Washington: Economic Research and Statistics Division. 
Online version: www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/download/globalinform.pdf 
 
Chen M A (2006) Rethinking the Informal Economy: Linkages with the Formal Economy and the Formal 
Regulatory Environment.  In B Guha-Khasnobis et al. (ed.) Linking the Formal and Informal Economy: Concepts 
and Policies (New York: Oxford University Press, UNU-WIDER Studies in Development Economics and EGDI), 
75—92. 
 
Chen M A, Jhabvala R and Lund F (2001) Supporting Workers in the Informal Economy: A Policy Framework. 
Paper prepared for ILO Task Force on the Informal Economy 
 
De Soto H (1989) The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World.  New York: Harper & Row 
 
Dreher A and Schneider F (2010) Corruption and the shadow economy: an empirical analysis. Public Choice, 
144: 215—238 
 
Greene, W J (2002): Econometric Analysis (New Delhi: Pearson Education Institution) 
 
Guha-Khasnobis B, Kanbur R and Ostrom E (2006) Beyond Formality and Informality. In B Guha-Khasnobis et al 
(ed) Linking the Formal and Informal Economy: Concepts and Policies (New York: Oxford University Press, UNU-
WIDER Studies in Development Economics and EGDI) 1—18. 
 
Gwartney J, Hall J and Lawson R (2010) Economic Freedom of the World: 2010 Annual Report. Vancouver: The 
Fraser Institute. Data retrieved from www.freetheworld.com 
 
Hart K (2006) Bureaucratic Form and the Informal Economy. In B Guha-Khasnobis et al (ed.) Linking the Formal 
and Informal Economy: Concepts and Policies (New York: Oxford University Press, UNU-WIDER Studies in 
Development Economics and EGDI) 21—35. 
 
Hart K (1973) Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana.  Journal of modern African 
Studies, 11(1): 61-89 
 
ILO (1972) Incomes Employment and Equality in Kenya. Geneva: ILO 
 
Jonnason E (2011) Government Effectiveness and Regional Variation in Informal Employment.  Forthcoming in 
the Journal of Development Economics, Working Paper No. 2010:13, Scandinavian Working Papers in 
Economics. Accessed at http://swopec.hhs.se/lunewp/abs/lunewp2010_013.htm on 20th August 2011 
 
Kanbur R (2009) Conceptualising Informality: Regulation and Enforcement. Cornell University, Department of 
Applied Economics and Management, Working Paper 09-11 
 
Kar S, Marjit S and Sarkar P (2003) Trade reform, internal capital mobility and informal wage: Theory and 
evidence. WIDER Conference on Sharing Global Prosperity, Helsinki. 
 
Loayza N V (1994) Labor Regulations and the Informal Economy. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
Series 1335 
 
Loayza N V, Oviedo A M and Serven L (2006) The Impact of Regulation on Growth and Informality: Cross 
Country Evidence. In B. Guha-Khasnobis et al (ed) Linking the Formal and Informal Economy: Concepts and 
Policies (New York: Oxford University Press, UNU-WIDER Studies in Development Economics and EGDI): 121—
144. 
24 
 
 
Maiti D and Marjit S (2008) Trade liberalization, production organization and informal sector of the developing 
countries. Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, 17(3): 453-461. 
 
Marjit S and Kar S (2011) The Outsiders: Economic Reform and Informal Labour in a Developing Economy, (New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press). 
 
Marjit S & Kar S and Beladi H (2007) Trade Reform and Informal Wages. Review of Development Economics, 
11(2): 313-320. 
 
Marjit S and Maiti D (2005) Globalization, reform and the informal sector. Research Paper 2005/12, Helsinki, 
United Nations University-World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER). 
 
Marjit S and Beladi H (2005) Does Trade increase employment? A developing country perspective. Unpublished 
document, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong. 
 
Rodrik D (2008) The New Development Economics: We shall Experiment, but how shall we learn?  HKS Working 
Paper No. RWP08-055, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. Accessed at Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1296115 on 20
th
 August 2011. 
 
Schnieder F (2002) Size and Measurement of the Informal Economy in 110 Countries around the World. 
Canberra: Australian National University, Australian National Tax Centre. 
 
Schneider F and Klinglmair R (2004) Shadow Economies around the World: What do we Know?  CESIFO 
Working Paper No. 1167 (Category 1: Public Finance) 
 
Wooldridge J M (2002) Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. South-Western College 
 
Wheatly J (2010) Labour Market: Informality outweighed by benefits of good governance (6 May). The Financial 
Times. 
Accessed at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/df73e324-571c-11df-aaff-00144feab49a.html#ixzz1UJApWPpI 
on 5
th
 August, 2011 
 
 
 
NOTES 
                                                 
1
 The ‗informal sector‘ was given its due recognition in development literature for the first time in the 
1970s following subsequent studies on the poor labour population of Africa conducted by International 
Labour Office (ILO) Mission to Kenya (1972) and Keith Hart (1973). 
2
 Traditionally, persistent informality ranges between 25 percent to more than 90 percent in 
developing countries. ILO figures indicate that in recent years informal employment was around 90 
percent in India and around 96 percent in Mali. 
3
 The informal economy forms a cushion to otherwise unemployed workforce (more precisely those 
who do not manage to secure formal employment) and provides a much needed breathing space to 
the majority of the workers in developing economies. In the past decade almost 60 percent of workers 
of the developing world found income opportunities in the informal economy (Baccheta et al., 2009). 
4
 Throughout our analysis we shall repeatedly encounter the concepts of rigid and flexible regulation. 
So we would at this very juncture try to precisely define the two most important concepts that this 
paper deals with. Rigid regulations are those that are assumed to sap all the incentives of economic 
agents to formalize. On the contrary, flexible regulations are designed so as to provide incentive to 
informal agents to formalize. The phrase flexible regulations as used in this study essentially means 
regulations designed to encourage formalization which include formalizing property rights of the 
workers, reducing tax rates on formal transaction, increasing availability of credit to small formal 
entrepreneurs, removal of price controls etc. More precisely, in line with the definition adopted in the 
database used for empirical analysis in the subsequent section, flexible regulations are assumed to 
increase the ―economic freedom‖ of the agents operating in the economy minimizing the intervening 
role of the state. 
5
 That the policy of building capacity of institutions so that they can handle the desired regulation is 
extremely important from policy view point is also illustrated by Nugent and Swaminathan (2006). 
They showed that when government of Indonesia backed the local health centres, this increased 
levels of voluntary labour supply to the centers. 
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6 Analyzing the linkages between governance effectiveness and informality for Brazil, Antonio 
Carvalho Neto of PUC, a university in Brazil, commented that ―If you go to a shopping centre [in 
Brazil] there will be two or three workers who have their work papers to show when the inspectors 
turn up, and the rest just pretend to be customers. This is in big towns. Imagine what it‘s like in the 
interior.‖ Mr. Carvalho claims Brazil suffers from a duplicity. ―The laws are quite good. But half the 
country is obliged to obey them and the other half takes no notice at all‖ (The Financial Times, 6 May 
2010). 
7
 Given the focus of this paper, the definition of informality used in this chapter identifies it with 
evasion of regulation. This definition was proposed by De Soto (1989) and has come to become the 
most popular definition of informality ever since. 
8
 In this study informal employment is simply used as a proxy in measuring size of informality. So we 
do not strictly differentiate between informal employment and employment in the informal sector. 
9
 Countries with small number of observations have been used in our analysis for their extreme 
relevance in the study of informality. For instance, although there are only 2 observations 
corresponding to Mali, it is retained because informal employment in Mali is more than 95 percent of 
its total employment! 
10
The KILM indicator is a measure of employment in the informal sector as a percentage of total 
employment, i.e. the ratio between the number of persons in informal sector employment and the total 
number of employed persons. There are wide variations in definitions and methodology of data 
collection related to the informal sector and there are as many as five series of employment in the 
informal sector data based on five different definitions. While one country might have had available 
information on informal sector employment according to multiple series, only one series is shown in 
the KILM database; this is the series deemed to be best in terms of definition applied, geographic 
coverage and/or length of the time series. 
11
 IILS gives four different measures of informal employment. We have used the series which is based 
on national definition of informal employment. 
12
 Indices of size of government, access to sound money and freedom to trade internationally are 
composite indices. Index of size of government is represents four aspects of governance, namely, 
government consumption spending as a percentage of total consumption, transfers and subsidies as 
a percentage of GDP, government enterprises and investment and top marginal tax rate. Index of 
access to sound money comprise of four sub-categories, namely, money growth, standard deviation 
of inflation, inflation in most recent year and freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts. Index of 
freedom to trade internationally represent four aspects of trade openness, namely, taxes on 
international trade, regulatory trade barriers, size of trade sector relative to expected, black market 
exchange rates and international capital market controls.  All these indices have been derived from 
Economic Freedom of the World Database (The Fraser Institute). 
13
 Baccheta et al. (2009) claim that application of standard least squares estimation technique is such 
analyses will yield biased and/or over-optimistic results since it is confirmed by various (panel) auto-
correlation tests that informality rates within countries are highly persistent. So to control for auto-
correlation, they suggest, preferred estimator should be generalized least squares, controlling in 
addition for heteroscedasticity and—depending on the model specification—for sample wide or panel-
specific autocorrelation. 
